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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Albania: In a major speech to the Albanian National Assembly on 25 October, Premier Shehu in effect reaffirmed his country's support for Communist China in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Shehu had just returned from the UN General Assembly, and directed a major portion of his remarks to Khrushchev's proposals there; in contrast to the positions taken by the other European satellites, however, he strongly implied these proposals were impractical. Shehu's speech, which, as in previous cases, reflected a view of the world situation similar to that held by the Chinese Communists, came at a time of new manifestations of Sino-Albanian amity and further evidence of Soviet-Albanian friction. (04)

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III. THE WEST

West Germany: The Bonn government apparently is trying to reduce tensions over the Berlin access issue by seeking some improvement in relations with the USSR, at least for the time being. According to a West German official, Adenauer is considering a visit to Moscow for this purpose. Foreign Minister Brentano, meanwhile, reportedly has indicated that the current negotiations with the USSR for a new trade agreement will be dragged out, possibly until March or April, in the expectation that Moscow will not put pressure on Berlin during these negotiations. Brentano is also quoted to the effect that interzonal trade with East Germany will be allowed to continue beyond 31 December so long as there are no further harassments of Berlin.]

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Albanian Premier Reaffirms Support for Chinese

Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu, speaking on 25 October to the National Assembly on the current international situation, in effect re-endorsed Albania's support for Communist China while at the same time paying lip service to certain of the Soviet leader's positions. He implied that some of Khrushchev's proposals made at the current UN General Assembly session are impractical, and he used arguments advanced in the past by the Chinese Communists to show why these proposals cannot be implemented. On the disarmament question, for example, he stated that while Albania supports Soviet proposals on this question, Albania believes the "imperialists will never accept" disarmament merely through "discussions." He went on to say that only through a determined struggle of all "peace-loving" peoples can disarmament be forced on the West.

Shehu, who implicitly criticized Khrushchev's meetings in New York with Tito, also directly disagreed with two Soviet-sponsored proposals advanced earlier by satellite leaders. He condemned the idea of total disarmament in the Balkans--proposed prior to the General Assembly meeting by Gheorghiu-Dej of Rumania and Zhivkov of Bulgaria--as "absurd and dangerous" as long as "imperialism" surrounds the bloc. He also disagreed with Gomulka's suggestion that a first step toward disarmament could be the acceptance of existing military bases on foreign soil if new bases are prohibited. He said this would involve acceptance of the presence of "hundreds of US bases" around the "socialist camp." Tirana probably sees in such Soviet bloc actions a threat to its importance as an "outpost of socialism" on the Adriatic and perhaps even to its existence as a state.

Shehu's speech comes at a time of continuing signs of Sino-Albanian amity and Soviet-Albanian friction. In a 24 October cable of thanks to Albania, China again congratulated Tirana for its consistency and for its struggle to keep Marxism-Leninism "pure." Deputy Premier Kellezi, in a speech on 26 October, following his return from Peiping, broadened Albania's support of Peiping to include Chinese internal policy, hailing the communes and the "leap forward" as "extremely correct" and

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creative developments of Marxist theory. According to an unconfirmed French report, the Soviet ambassador to Albania has been out of the country for several weeks "ostensibly because of illness." The Soviet chargé allegedly has been denied access to the Foreign Ministry, while the Chinese ambassador is daily received in the ministry as well as by the party politburo and secretariat. The report also claims that Soviet technicians have been withdrawn from Albania.

Shehu also strongly implied that the shake-up in the Albanian party may continue. He stated ominously that revisionists and opportunists, who describe China as "dogmatic" and predisposed toward war, can still be found in Tirana and elsewhere in the bloc.

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[Redacted]

Bonn Seeks to Reduce Tensions Over Berlin

[The West German Government apparently is trying to reduce tensions over the Berlin access issue by seeking some improvement in relations with the USSR, at least for the immediate future. The Soviet ambassador in Bonn reportedly told leaders of the opposition Social Democratic party on 20 October that Chancellor Adenauer may visit Moscow next May, and a West German official on the High Authority of the Coal-Steel Community has stated that the chancellor is considering such a trip.]

[Adenauer is reported encouraged by Khrushchev's friendly overtures to the West German ambassador in Moscow in response to Adenauer's letter on renewed repatriation of Germans from the USSR. Although there is little prospect that such a meeting would produce any real understanding between Bonn and Moscow, Adenauer may view a meeting with Khrushchev as a means of postponing new negotiations on Berlin until after the German elections in September 1961. He may also feel that direct talks with Khrushchev--which could produce an agreement on repatriation--would enhance his prestige with the German voters.]

[Foreign Minister von Brentano reportedly has indicated that the present negotiations with the USSR for a new trade agreement will be dragged out, possibly until March or April, in the belief that Moscow will not put pressure on Berlin while the negotiations continue. He added that at the last minute Bonn will demand that the agreement must also apply to West Berlin and will insist on new negotiations if the USSR objects.]

[Brentano is also quoted to the effect that West German interzonal trade with East Germany will be allowed to continue after the present agreement lapses on 31 December if there are no further harassments of Berlin. Brentano explained that although Bonn's aim is to return eventually to the status quo, its immediate objective is to buy time--"well into the spring or summer of 1961."]

[The present German-Soviet trade agreement, concluded early in 1958 and scheduled to expire on 31 December this year,]

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[provided for an exchange of goods totaling \$744,000,000. Emphasis has been placed on West German shipments of producer goods--including steel pipe, chemical plant equipment, and machinery--and Soviet deliveries of raw materials and food-stuffs. West German chief negotiator von Zahn-Stranik has assured American officials in Bonn that he will firmly resist expected Soviet demands for a five-year agreement, but he indicated that the USSR, as in 1958, would probably not accept anything less than three years.]

[American officials have observed that although Bonn has successfully withstood the more unreasonable Soviet demands for high trade quotas, each succeeding round of talks has produced substantial increases, and they expect that this will continue to be the case in the future. Under the present agreement, quotas have generally been about 75 percent fulfilled.]

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